Cultural groups as survival vehicles and the concept of symbiotic cognition
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20253114 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marc Slors (0000-0002-4459-2859, Radboud University Nijmegen, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2025-12-31 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Cogent Arts and Humanities (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2331-1983 • E-ISSN: 2331-1983 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/23311983.2025.2513139 |
| OpenAlex | W4411160326 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 57 |
The idea that group-level processes and organizational structures in human societies contribute to the cognitive processes of individual human beings is defended in various ways. This does not mean that individual cognitive processes are widely thought to be determined, in part, by genuine top-down influence of group-level processes. On the contrary, such top-down influence is generally associated with metaphysical oddness or worse. In this paper I claim that top-down influence is part of human cognition, and that there is no metaphysical oddness involved when we acknowledge (i) that cognition is intimately tied-up with the survival of organisms, (ii) that cultural groups serve as survival vehicles for human beings, and when (iii) we approach cognition and survival from an evolutionary angle. I use a discussion of Tomasello’s shared intentionality hypothesis to argue that human cognition consists of two superimposed ‘layers’ that can be compared with the levels of explanation required to account for systems of mutualistic symbiosis in biology
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Child and Animal Learning Development · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Language and cultural evolution · Neuroscience · Psychology
The Company of Strangers
Cognitive Integration
Making the Social World
Shared Agency
Becoming Human
Cognitive Gadgets
Cognitive Integration
Enactivist Interventions
Explaining Behavior
Evolving Enactivism
Understanding Institutions
Cognition in the Wild
The Secret of Our Success
The socially extended mind
The cultural ecosystem of human cognition
Recognizing Communicative Intentions in Infancy
The Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation
The moral psychology of obligation
Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens)
Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Joint Commitment
Explaining the Cultural Evolution of large-scale Collaboration
Collective Intentions and Actions
Social learning and social cognition
Transactive Memory
Second Nature
The Origin and Evolution of Cultures
A Natural History of Human Thinking
The Embodied Mind
Autopoiesis and Cognition
Autopoiesis, free energy, and the life–mind continuity thesis
Developing the incentivized action view of institutional reality
Life-mind continuity
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind
Precís of A Natural History of Human Thinking
| Highly cited | No |
|---|