The fine-tuning argument
The ‘design inference’ version
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20310210 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Graham Wood (0000-0002-0307-9012, University of Tasmania, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 467-471 |
| Publication date | 2006-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412506008493 |
| OpenAlex | W2116305750 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
William Dembski claims that the fine-tuning supports the inference that the universe was designed. His ‘design inference’ is based on the identification of two features of the fine-tuning. Dembski claims that it is a ‘specified’ event of small (a priori) probability. Specification, in this context, is the ability to describe an event without using any knowledge of the actual event itself. I argue that we currently do not have the ability to describe accurately the fine-tuning of the universe without using any knowledge of the fine-tuning itself. If we cannot generate a specification, then the fine-tuning is not a specified event, so the ‘design inference’ is not justified
A priori and a posteriori · Algorithm · Anthropic principle · Argument (complex analysis) · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Event (particle physics) · Fine-tuning · Identification (biology) · Inference · Physics · Programming language · Teleological argument · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Evolution and Science Education · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life
| Highly cited | No |
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