‘The metaphysical objection’ and concurrentist co-operation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20311310 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Timothy D Miller (0000-0003-3653-9692, Lee University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 649-657 |
| Publication date | 2022-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412521000287 |
| OpenAlex | W4206181767 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
The foundation of W. Matthews Grant's project in Free Will and God's Universal Causality is his Non-Occasionalist version of Divine Universal Causality (NODUC), which affirms the traditional concurrentist idea that God and secondary causes cooperate non-superfluously in such a way that they both produce the entire effect. Grant defends NODUC's concurrentist account by responding to ‘The Metaphysical Objection’, which alleges that concurrentism places an inconsistent set of demands upon secondary causes. I argue that Grant's responses to that objection are unconvincing, and thus, he fails to demonstrate that NODUC is a stable foundation for the rest of his project
Causality (physics) · Epistemology · Foundation (evidence) · Metaphysics · Physics · Political science · Quantum mechanics · Rest (music) · Set (abstract data type) · Theology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Highly cited | No |
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