Murphy's Anselmian theism and the problem of evil

Bibliographic Data

ID20311596
AuthorsLuke Wilson (0000-0001-8796-2824, Illinois Wesleyan University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume60
Issue4
Pages549-563
Publication date2024-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReligious Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0034412523000604
OpenAlexW4384036022
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited29

Mark Murphy has recently defended a novel account of divine agency on which God would have very minimal requiring reasons and a wide range of merely justified reasons. This account grounds his response to the problem of evil. If God would not have requiring reasons to promote the well-being of creatures, Murphy argues, then the evil we observe would not count as evidence against theism. I argue that Murphy's conclusion, if successful in undermining the problem of evil, also undermines probabilistic arguments for theism. However, there is good reason to resist his conclusion. Even if God does not have requiring reasons, but merely has justifying reasons, to promote creaturely well-being, God may nevertheless have most motivating reason to do so, and this would be enough to predict divine action, at least given Murphy's further assumption that God is perfectly free. It does not follow from the rational permissibility of God's Φ-ing that it is possible for God to Φ

Creatures · Epistemology · Existence of God · Philosophy of religion · Problem of Evil · Theism · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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