A conceptualist argument for a spiritual substantial soul
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20311665 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J P Moreland (0000-0002-4749-9692, Biola University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 35-43 |
| Publication date | 2013-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412512000133 |
| OpenAlex | W2107785388 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 5 |
I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism – minimally, the view that we are spiritual substances that have bodies – based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking (i.e. conscious) matter is metaphysically possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept of God's being a divine spirit
Argument (complex analysis) · Dualism · Epistemology · Existence of God · Focus (optics) · Metaphysics · Ontological argument · Philosophy of religion · Soul · Theism · Chemistry · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2023 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |