Naturalism, theism, and multiply realizable mental states
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20311840 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kevin Michael Vandergriff (0000-0002-1992-847X, California State University, Sacramento, corresponding author), Kevin Vandergriff |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 91-105 |
| Publication date | 2018-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412516000421 |
| OpenAlex | W2588587459 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 4 |
Paul Draper has argued that the scientific evidence for the dependence of mental states upon brain states provides a good reason for thinking that theism is very probably false because the extreme metaphysical dualism implied by theism makes it antecedently likely, if God exists, that minds should be fundamentally non-physical entities. However, Draper's argument assumes that what makes God's mind a mind is the immaterial stuff it is made of. But that assumption is potentially faulty. Why? Because, if functionalism is true, then all conceivable minds are fundamentally functional entities identified by what they do, rather than by what they are made of
Argument (complex analysis) · Dualism · Epistemology · Functionalism (philosophy of mind) · Metaphysics · Naturalism · Philosophy of mind · Physicalism · Pluralism (philosophy) · Supervenience · Theism · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |