Non-resistant non-belief is pervasive

Bibliographic Data

ID20311967
AuthorsAndrew Blanton (0000-0003-4852-4383, University of Birmingham, corresponding author)
Year2025
Pages1-21
Publication date2025-10-28
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReligious Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0034412525101261
OpenAlexW4415607148
LanguageEN
References cited48

J.L. Schellenberg’s argument from divine hiddenness partly rests on the claim that non-resistant non-belief exists. In this paper, I take up the question of whether such non-belief is pervasive and argue that it is, in fact, relatively common. To support this claim, I present a novel argument grounded in a distinction between acquisition responsibility and maintenance responsibility. I argue that, for a non-believer to count as resistant in Schellenberg’s sense, they must be acquisition-responsible for their non-belief in God. I further contend that many non-believers lack such responsibility and therefore qualify as non-resistant. This argument has the added benefit of showing that many prominent objections to the existence of non-resistant non-belief are irrelevant or incomplete. Finally, I highlight the broader significance of this conclusion, both for Schellenberg’s argument and in light of recent shifts in the literature towards more evidential approaches

Argument (complex analysis) · Event (particle physics) · Free will · Ontological argument · Possible world · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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