Moral Autonomy and Divine Commands
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20312385 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chan L Coulter (Gettysburg College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 117-129 |
| Publication date | 1989-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412500019764 |
| OpenAlex | W2092159899 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 3 |
A Divine Command Theory of Ethics is sometimes rejected on the grounds that such a theory is incompatible with human moral autonomy. If we assume that human beings are morally autonomous, the argument goes, then no human being can be obligated to perform any action simply because God (or any other agent) has commanded it. The incompatibility between a Divine Command Ethic and moral autonomy is a corollary of an argument James Rachels uses to deny the very existence of God. He argues that any being which can be denoted by the term God must be a being worthy of worship. But, in order to be a being worthy of worship it must be such that other beings owe it unconditional obedience. Since human beings are morally autonomous and cannot owe unconditional obedience to any other being, nothing can meet the criterion for being God. Hence, there is no possible state of affairs which includes both a being worthy of worship and morally autonomous human agents
Argument (complex analysis) · Autonomy · Conscience · Epistemology · Nothing · Obedience · Political science · Theology · Worship · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citations per year | 0.1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2016 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |