Replying to the anti-God challenge
A God without moral character acts well
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20312502 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter Forrest (0000-0002-5575-0664) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 35-43 |
| Publication date | 2012-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412511000023 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 9 |
Several authors, including Stephen Law in this journal, have argued that the case for an evil God is (about) as strong as for a good God. In this article I take up the challenge on behalf of theists who, like Richard Swinburne, argue for an agent of unrestricted power and knowledge as the ultimate explanation of all contingent truths. I shall argue that an evil God is much less probable than a good one. I do so by (1) distinguishing the analogical predication of ‘good’ or ‘evil’ of God from the literal predication, (2) interpreting ‘acting in a morally good way’ to mean ‘acting like a good consequentialist’, and (3) relying on an axiarchist thesis about agency that is congenial to theists and perhaps even presupposed by theism
| Citations per year | 0.88 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |