Divine freedom and contingency
An intelligibility problem for (some) theistic compatibilists
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20312801 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Justin J Daeley (0000-0002-9720-1962, University of Northwestern, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 563-582 |
| Publication date | 2015-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412514000419 |
| OpenAlex | W2002941664 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 30 |
This article argues that the Theistic Compatibilist's typical understanding of what amounts to an intelligible, non-arbitrary free choice undermines God's freedom and the contingency of creation. I further suggest and reject four possible ways for Theistic Compatibilists to respond to this problem in light of their metaphysical commitments to freedom and explanation. I close with discussion of a possible way for Theistic Compatibilists to avoid this problem
Compatibilism · Contingency · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Intelligibility (philosophy) · Metaphysics · Theism · Free Will and Agency · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Highly cited | No |
|---|