God, evil, and occasionalism

Bibliographic Data

ID20312954
AuthorsMatthew Shea (0000-0003-2984-439X, Saint Louis University, corresponding author), C P RAGLAND (0000-0002-4189-3306, Saint Louis University, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume54
Issue2
Pages265-283
Publication date2018-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReligious Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0034412517000129
OpenAlexW2607510291
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited8

In a recent paper, Alvin Plantinga defends occasionalism against an important moral objection: if God is the sole direct cause of all the suffering that results from immoral human choices, this causal role is difficult to reconcile with God's perfect goodness. Plantinga argues that this problem is no worse for occasionalism than for any of the competing views of divine causality; in particular, there is no morally relevant difference between God directly causing suffering and God indirectly causing it. First, we examine Plantinga's moral parity argument in detail and offer a critical evaluation of it. Then we provide a positive argument, based on the doctrine of doing and allowing, to show why there is a morally relevant difference between God's direct and indirect causation of suffering

Argument (complex analysis) · Causality (physics) · Causation · Doctrine · Epistemology · Moral responsibility · Theology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification

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