Jorge Garcia and the Ordinary Use of "Racist Belief"

Wittgenstein’s “grammatical method” analyzes multiple uses of language across contexts of use, with the aim of identifying differences and dissolving conceptual confusion. This paper uses Wittgenstein’s method to undermine Jorge L. A. Garcia’s volitional account of racism. Garcia claims that his theory accommodates the ordinary use of terms like “racist belief.” However, he did not consider whether such terms might have multiple uses/meanings. My paper identifies three uses of “racist belief” that escape Garcia’s analysis. Consequently, philosophers should take Wittgenstein’s advice to heart: do not assume that target-terms have a single use, but “look and see” whether they do

Applied philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Garcia · Humanities · Sociology · Critical Race Theory in Education · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Race, History, and American Society · Social Psychology

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  Open Access•Alberto G Urquidez•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2021

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