Public Reason Can Be Reasonably Rejected
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20317756 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Franz Mang (0000-0003-1496-9763, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 343-367 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Theory and Practice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0037-802X • E-ISSN: 2154-123X |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/soctheorpract20172146 |
| OpenAlex | W2590292413 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 3 |
Public reason as a political ideal aims to reconcile reasonable disagreement; however, is public reason itself the object of reasonable disagreement? Jonathan Quong, David Estlund, Andrew Lister, and some other philosophers maintain that public reason is beyond reasonable disagreement. I argue this view is untenable. In addition, I consider briefly whether or not two main versions of the public reason principle, namely, the consensus version and the convergence version, need to satisfy their own requirements. My discussion has several important implications for the debate on public reason
Applied philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Economics · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · General interest · Positive economics · Sociology · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
Why Public Reason Could Not Be Too Modest
State perfectionism and the importance of Confucianism for East Asia's future development
Public Reason Confucianism Without Foundation?
Confucianism, Perfectionism, and Liberal Society
Is it Sectarian for a Rawlsian State to Coerce Nozick? – On Political Liberalism and the Sectarian Critique
Conspiracy Theories and Democratic Legitimacy
An Instrumentalist Theory of Political Legitimacy
Against insular liberalism
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |