Wittgenstein and the Utility of Disagreement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20317798 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James Pearson (0000-0002-7010-8506, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-31 |
| Publication date | 2016-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Theory and Practice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0037-802X • E-ISSN: 2154-123X |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/soctheorpract20164211 |
| OpenAlex | W2280386376 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
This paper focuses on the theme of intersubjective disagreement in the late Wittgenstein and how his thought can be applied to our understanding of deliberative political practice.To this end, the study critically compares the contradictory readings of Wittgenstein that we find epitomized in Saul Kripke and James Tully.Drawing on Tully (and Stanley Cavell), I argue against Kripke that widespread disagreement over meaning does not necessarily threaten the utility of social practices.Notwithstanding, I also demonstrate how Tully's reading, which can be considered pro-disagreement, is in need of refinement if certain misreadings are to be foreclosed and Wittgenstein is to be properly invoked as theoretical support for more comprehensive approaches to deliberative practice
Analytic philosophy · Applied philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Citations per year | 0.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2022 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |