Geographies of Responsibility

The problem of free will and determinism is an ancient philosophical conundrum. That venerable problem deals with the very theoretical question of whether our being responsible for anything makes any sense at all. In its oldest forms, it is a problem about the structure of the world in which we go about our lives: if there is fate, or divine foreknowledge, or universal mechanistic causality, do human beings really choose what they do? In some more contemporary discussions, the problem is relocated to the structure of that inner world from which our actions are seen as proceeding: if we are propelled by psychological states the formation or force of which we do not, or do not fully or decisively, control or identify with, do “we” really choose what we do, or is free human agency itself a myth? These ways of posing the “problem of freedom” as the crux of responsibility rarely touch issues about actual responsibilities in our personal relations or institutional roles, or in the interactions between them. Answers to the problem so posed have never helped anyone decide what he or she is, actually and in particular, responsible for. Some thinking on responsibilities is not waiting for the shoe to drop with respect to the “problem of freedom.” If philosophers have long toiled on the cosmology of responsibility and the psychology of responsibility, some diverse recent work might be thought of as the geography of responsibility. While this work is theoretical, the theory is meant to tell us something about responsibilities as assigned and assumed in actual life. It begins from the premise (or at least after the fact) that we do a great deal of holding each other responsible, and that it is unclear that there is any alternative to doing so. So it tries to map features of our practices of responsibility as they follow, but sometimes sharpen or elevate, the contours of interpersonal life and the trajectories of human activity. It tries to see how this topography of individual action and social life regulates a flow of shared understandings about who is going to be asked to take care of, or to account for, certain situations, outcomes, tasks, or obligations. Our actual practices of responsibility—of holding ourselves and others to account, and taking ourselves and others to task—turn out to be surprising and more than a little confusing. One of the surprises is how much our holding each other responsible goes beyond, behind, and around what we simply and uncontroversially do. What is more than a little confusing is figuring out the seeming patchwork of assumptions and distinctions that give some predictable form to how we do this. It's a philosopher's gold mine or nightmare, depending on your point of view: so much responsibility, so few sharp and straight rules. We see numerous things as our responsibilities: tasks that are up to us, situations we have precipitated, outcomes to which we have made contributions. We feel concerned, responsible, or guilty, in prospect or retrospect, not only for things we intentionally do or intend to do, but also for things we caused but didn't intend or, in some cases, even foresee. We feel the burden of commitments or obligations deserted even when we had good reasons, including good moral reasons, for not following through. We weigh responsibilities for our roles alongside others’ in outcomes that we did not bring about alone, or that we might only have brought about with others’ cooperation and support. We sometimes blame ourselves for what we have become or have failed to. Of course, we do not only think and feel such things about ourselves: we expect, sometimes demand, that others acknowledge such thoughts and feelings too. The stakes here are not restricted to blame and recrimination, acknowledgments and apologies; demands for compensation, and penalties or punishments, may come in too. Conversely, we are all of us alert and sensitive to being assigned responsibilities, coming or going, that we find arbitrary, unfair, ill-distributed, disproportionate, or simply not ours. Peter French, amusingly but with serious point, has called this tangle of practices of holding each other to account the “Responsibility Barter Game.” Like golf, French says, the goal is to finish a given round with fewer points rather than more. “The minimum achievable score is zero, though it is seldom attained if the player is really in the game.”1 The “game” metaphor calls our attention to a (possibly complicated) structure of rules (and perhaps “calls” within the rules), and to different positions or circumstances in which rules apply. It further suggests we look at all of this as a humanly fabricated practice sustained and revised in the course of shared activity. These are helpful heuristics. But moral responsibility is not, of course, a game, and our practices of responsibility serve complex expressive, regulative, and corrective functions that are deep and sometimes urgent. By holding each other responsible we hope to keep ourselves and others out of unnecessary harm's way, but to do this in part by means of mutual understandings of what we expect of each other. In holding each other responsible we define common understandings of personal agency, shape shared reactions to its exercise, guide each others’ attention to things that matter and need looking out for, and express the forms and limits of our relationships, roles, and communities. It would be convenient if each of us were responsible only for what he or she wholly and solely did, and did voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally. And it would be satisfying to think that when one had done in this way the very best that circumstances permitted, there was nothing more than this for which to account to anyone. It would be convenient and satisfying, but it seems not to be true to the ways we actually assess and allot responsibility (chap. 1). Many philosophers insist that being responsible for things not wholly and solely under one's conscious or voluntary control is repugnant or even paradoxical. They have objected to “moral luck” and have taken pains to show that this must involve mere appearance, failure to make a needed distinction, or something deeply unacceptable in our practices of responsibility themselves.2 But responsibilities in excess of strict or unilateral control turn out to be the rule rather than the exception; what sounds right “in principle” is not the way we do things in fact, and we have varied reasons for having the practices we do.3 I take a brief look here at recent work on four issues: the consequences of acting and individual contributions to outcomes; and, more briefly, formation (or reformation) of our own character, and the implications of our multiple commitments. I suggest a few examples of problems this work could help us address, with confidence that readers will think of many other ripe and challenging applications. One form of “unlucky” responsibility which disturbs some philosophers is responsibility for consequences of one's actions that were not intended, perhaps unforeseen, and partly or completely beyond one's control. This issue arises mostly in connection with cases where someone is held to the consequences of having acted in a faulty manner, for example, when a negligent or intoxicated or distracted surgeon is unfortunate enough to injure someone, for lack of the control, care, or attention that might have averted the injury. But even here there's a large element of chance in meeting up with circumstances that lead to the dreadful outcome; many equally or more negligent, intoxicated, or distracted surgeons are fortunate enough not to harm their patients. Troubling cases can arise as well when one does what one thinks is right, or harmless, or relatively self-contained, or under control, and some mess, harm, upset, or disaster ensues that was set in train by what one did. Even if what one did was a necessary condition for the outcome, it was usually not a sufficient one. Think, for example, of informed consent. The physician gives or withholds information, and many things result directly, although by no means exclusively, from what the patient has or has not been told. There are also many cases in which what any member of a health care team does makes only some contribution to an unfortunate overall outcome, but the overall outcome is largely determined by the sum, or by some (perhaps indeterminate) subset, of these contributions. Everyone involved in care-giving teams, or staffs, or institutions is party to such contributions all the time. In all these kinds of case, something of significance comes about in part because of something someone did, but it took more than what that person did to make the untoward result come about. Events, and sometimes other actors, contribute or intervene. Rather than being an exception or oddity, however, this situation is the standard scene of human action. Most of what anybody ever does involves just very basic actions, like movements or utterances, intended by actors under some description. What turns these basic actions into the more robust ones with which we concern ourselves is contributed by interactions of settings and circumstances, brute causality or human I I I might have for a on a made an or a that to a this about in some on action and responsibility that are the for that common of human actions by which their take in more than a action If I a and this I If I a that and of the not much I Our many for human actions that not only that intentionally do but that other things in Even where we do not have like or we can that someone caused something to come about because action did. it is not action that has brought about the we be responsible for what we where what we goes beyond what we do? And can such responsibility make us that it work to to responsibility to of the or as a way to the of having other contribute to what have chance other and circumstances can even or the of states as and or of a certain are at necessary for certain feelings to or to be or of or someone make all the to whether someone or to be or a The point of this is not to work up some philosopher's about how we never do the point is the We or ourselves from What we in do in the matter of responsibilities is to whether and or after just how certain contributions are to certain or If they are we need to decide whether are of blame for what and the of how and deep these points that of moral responsibility are never just straight about some that (or their of and contemporary of responsibility, and own of cases, that of moral responsibility is really one about whether action (or caused the other about whether that person is in of this to blame for what was of these are because each in of The of responsibility is whether an individual is responsible for how of contribution to an outcome involves not only about but also assumptions about our of social roles and the of our That is, contributions are a of about who can or (or in certain situations, and assumptions about situations and which outcomes are certain This for example, on the about whether there is a between someone and the person and more about doing something and it to If a or is the of for consequences someone may have to account, a or is not the of any but rather is itself an action in a one that in of some other action that a individual or some might have the or to be something for which someone is and so to it is not enough that something could have been done in the at It must be true as well that something have been us how that actions are because of their outcomes on our about what outcomes are to look out for. very these are not at in but at in certain roles, relationships, and perhaps it is to do one rather than in a certain The and Peter French of as a of and in and the of of This gives us reasons to that there could be any completely between doing something that to an outcome and the outcome any rule from to to to we must expect it to matter who it is, who does or something and in which circumstances this is it will be the moral to such in such circumstances that the have been done by that person In situations, these may even the could have been done by at to for in and and and they may also for or in each of these roles as the situations they It may well be that some of are never for of to to with the roles of the in which they find and the moral and other that to It might also be that certain are only for or never for but sometimes for In of care, it is and in more ways and that set these our attention on how this is how many of our moral responsibilities are not just We have and might need to our about which things are up to which ones of are these are about what institutions to and what practices to and within them. The of responsibility is whether an individual who is responsible is of blame for what has been that whether someone is turns on whether she or he has being however, involves not only about how things and about human and control, but about how much can be to or to control in are turns on or assumptions and What of recent of and responsibility for and to one's or to to which and there is a question of when something someone does is to be as some situation to that is, when it makes an enough issues of contributions may be kinds of cases and of the as to of contribution and of But to this is the question of whether ways of that are in own or or that of are ones that The for here are and how much whether they in work or with health what forms of they how they or with and how they have how much they exercise, whether they of and what they make of the and many If any such issues are going to be ones on which of will it will be by a of in some of these for what we expect, of in the way of and This in really means and institutional of and if we to into such at all. with a large of to which I have some The of is that where there are moral responsibility there are with sometimes assumptions and not just these assumptions may of different moral responsibility is a part of social and is not to moral relations to but to the and relations between practices of holding each other responsible are by shared assumptions and by of but they are also a means for and us to see how we each about who is responsible for what (and for in to actual and problems of life. I some examples to suggest how much more than might to our assumptions in different or to is and moral it on it is someone to and it a have been assigned and how well or has on issues of and including and recent as a may be for who are not to to as well as to who While here is to the of as a guide to that it may not be the best for personal of is by a of it makes sense of how we actually and blame than that on and is and moral responsibility, it on it is someone to and it a have been assigned and how well or The to responsibility, features of that do not, or do not as and features of acting and the of responsibility may have more or of what is and may have done that more or In particular, a of or blame in more how responsibility is different in cases where the actions of multiple are for, or contribute an the issue the of shared responsibilities when different make contributions to a The here is that responsibilities do not to If the action of each was fully sufficient to (or an outcome, for example, each is fully responsible, and responsibilities to more than one. in cases where contributions an outcome, responsibilities to than one. cases of and actions, as well as of and that any relations between responsibility and or and would have be come into and a between responsibility and causality, and to make sense of our practices of responsibility. In out to our of responsibility within makes a that an of responsibility that faulty or simply make good sense of the responsibilities of While as to the consequences here take up the not just its and While this our and and character, it is a corrective to the little attention to how much it what actually and how (and it can be to decide and who is to (or to and a between responsibility and causality, and to make sense of our practices of responsibility. In who has about of responsibility to out to our of responsibility within In what he as a issues about the of on and of on their or The of moral responsibility here is that who one to What comes under are and states of and character, roles and and the and social that shape our and even as we contribute to in moral responsibility into voluntary rather than causality or control. While an on usually the of responsibility, comes by the sense of what we not just at one but in of the course of a but result is that we responsible for of and and that us to moral more is that come to see as responsible for certain or their even when were not in the harm and in some cases where they could not have of is responsibility for moral for acting and to in ways that harm, or out of We are and feel for our own or character, to a or or or to with our institutional or roles or that these for responsibility are not intended as for to suggests not just but and are individual reactions to responsibility. While I at the to take responsibility from it is to what practices might the he and are with and of and in that shape what think is and what they become to not attention to. and have implications for all of us who at some or many within institutions where outcomes are the work of many and health care is of course ever and such a an and of of them. in and the and the patient in of and the physician in of the of that were others or for While issues of and are these might take on very different and more demands in the of complex of care and of responsibilities of who make care The and deeply roles and of and have sometimes been in or simply (perhaps on perhaps on at There are also many other of the of to care to care social care patient and alternative health acting in health care-giving and roles within these responsibility, not just but for at it is that they to think of and to be thought of, that they form a very that a care is the of involved in any care (and in that of well makes this into a in which what someone is doing at one point is from the of at other and in which itself turns out to be It is up to of practices of health care and of to of these complex and of responsibility within them. But it up to and to decide what will be set for responsible and how to make these of moral responsibility have assumed that actions from and They have sometimes held that are responsible only for actions that do so. one form of moral one might is having a or by unfortunate and In some philosophers like examples with or ones are by someone at a but varied situations of actual social life are more looking at here and more too. on the of of to and of and a the of respect for that demands responsibility of with how it is to that we can and must each other responsible for of character, and and even if needed in these can only be done at a the and the moral consequences of assumptions of and and about and that of as and others’ of as fully of and has long and the problem of under and and with an to as well as and take on but of how our but very are but not by how and for what we are held They bring of as well as needed with features of social to the of how human beings to the even when the actual is or of and formation in social may be for health practices and There is in our on the one a of that to our as our the other there is a of that to largely or completely to individual and their states many of that are or The up in in to or in as to or this the one of being an being an of by of what is in this is the failure to that and following of and other are no of responsible, agency than are or or a to up in such as and for example, as solely in individual (perhaps rather than this as to social and and the social as of a health and sometimes between person and and individual and are it is responsible to we about our we think of things it would be not to take care of and be and as much about commitments to in our personal and institutional roles as about moral obligations to others and But it would be thinking to that we could any of these responsibilities from ever in the way of some arise obligations and so that we what some at the of what others demand, we find ourselves in a we there is something or something and the or deserted seems to on as a of “moral itself in or have been a in recent These moral cases have mostly been seen as in it be for to issue in demands or or for moral moral be with and take from these discussions, but the problem of moral in the or psychological of in In and that as of moral a moral of to on the and of and the ways we must to that on the of our connection to (or social is a of the demands that arise from the varied and multiple to others that make up human life. While moral is relatively a of or case, that to responsibilities is part of the structure of human and arises even when there is a best or right to do. in these cases to something to of or Most of our are not only on and but on psychological and interpersonal and and and to show how and the sense of responsibility it is sometimes even if one has made the best In she the to this in moral and the structure it for moral are in force by shared of moral the of in moral to the social and psychological of the that gives its must work after and by of moral in to its in cases it for action when a moral must go an account of humanly made but moral is in of how in and makes has been with examples of and that give the and Many of these which or must make at Many problems of many in that not only for but the and of shared Most of our are not only on and but on psychological and interpersonal and and and It is that and will help us much in well to these for attention and are sometimes the best we can do but in the right they may be The about responsibility here are not with each other in or basic They are all of however, with a to a theory of responsibility in the of actual problems and of personal and social life. The one it seems we do in the Barter is simply decide not to

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