Are Technologies Innocent
Part Seven: Conclusion [Commentary]
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20364154 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Arnold (0000-0002-5796-4578, The University of Melbourne), Michael Arnold (0000-0002-6921-3720), Christopher Pearce (0000-0001-5371-8196, The University of Melbourne) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 86-87 |
| Publication date | 2017-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | IEEE Technology and Society Magazine (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0278-0097 • E-ISSN: 1937-416X |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1109/mts.2017.2697058 |
| OpenAlex | W2625802293 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 1 |
Presents an analysis of whether technologies can be considered innocent from their intended purpose. In a series of installments it has been argued that moral agents are not in principle limited to members of the human race, that non-humans and in particular technologies can be considered to act in the world, and that when they do so, they cannot be regarded as just tools or dumb instruments, that the actions of technologies are willful and occur in the foreknowledge of consequences, in a significant way, and that even technologies that are distributed in time and space may be defined with sufficient specificity to allocate moral accountability. Taken together, it has been argued that technologies are not innocent, and can be held to moral account
Accountability · Business · Computer security · Emerging technologies · Engineering ethics · Epistemology · Foreknowledge · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Computer Science · Engineering · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Law · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |