AI and Spinoza
A review of law’s conceptual treatment of Lethal Autonomous
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20396759 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Moa De Lucia Dahlbeck (0000-0002-8641-8269, University of Gothenburg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 797-805 |
| Publication date | 2021-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | AI & Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5666 • E-ISSN: 1435-5655 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00146-020-01014-x |
| OpenAlex | W3040780138 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
In this article I will argue that the philosophy of Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) may assist us in coming to terms with some of the conceptual challenges that the phenomenon of Artificial Intelligence (AI) poses on law and legal thought. I will pursue this argument in three steps. First, I will suggest that Spinoza’s philosophy of the mind and knowledge may function as an analytical tool for making sense of the prevailing conception of AI within the legal discourse on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Then, I will continue the argument with the aid of Spinoza’s political philosophy which partly complicates the picture as it seems to disqualify a normative process grounded directly upon the means stipulated for achieving a robust understanding of AI. Based on these two separate discussions I will conclude by outlining a composite critique – from the twofolded perspective of Spinoza’s ethical and political discussions – of the ongoing negotiations of a new Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW) protocol on LAWS
Epistemology · Negotiation · Normative · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Law · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
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