Epistemic disagreement in psychopathology research and practice

A procedural model

Bibliographic Data

ID20400434
AuthorsTony Ward (0000-0002-6292-2364, Victoria University of Wellington), Jacqueline Sullivan (0000-0003-3042-4632, University of Western Ontario), Russil Durrant (0000-0001-8231-4940, Victoria University of Wellington, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume34
Issue4
Pages484-507
Publication date2024-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheory & Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0959-3543 • E-ISSN: 1461-7447
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/09593543241263806
OpenAlexW4400981080
LanguageEN
References cited47

Clinical psychology is characterized by persistent disagreement about fundamental aspects of the discipline ranging from what mental disorders are to what constitutes effective treatment. Attempts to address the problem of epistemic disagreement have been frequently based on establishing the correct answer by fiat without identifying and addressing the sources of the disagreement. We argue that this strategy has not worked very well and the result is frequently ongoing and intractable disagreement, with each side in an argument convinced they are correct. In this paper, we outline an epistemic disagreement procedural model intended to assist researchers and clinicians in the field of clinical psychology to identify, explore, and develop inquiry strategies that capitalize on situations where competing knowledge claims are made. The result is a flexible conceptual framework committed to a defensible epistemic pluralism, fallibilism, and contextualism, across the various research tasks constituting the field of clinical psychology

Epistemology · Psychopathology · Anxiety, Depression, Psychometrics, Treatment, Cognitive Processes · Clinical Psychology · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Mental Health Research Topics · Philosophy · Psychology

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