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Bounded Rationality in Taking Risks and Drawing Inferences

Bibliographic Data

ID20401512
AuthorsMike Oaksford (0000-0003-3383-3642, Bangor University), Nick Chater (0000-0002-9745-0686, University of Edinburgh)
Year1992
Volume2
Issue2
Pages225-230
Publication date1992-05-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheory & Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0959-3543 • E-ISSN: 1461-7447
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0959354392022009
OpenAlexW2151934017
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited14

This commentary provides a discussion of the concept of `bounded rationality' as it applies to the theses advanced by Lopes (1991) and Evans (1991). Lopes's (1991) assessment of the irrationalist consequences of Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) work on heuristics and biases is premature because bounded rationality implies that people could not employ optimal strategies. Considerations of bounded rationality also provide additional criteria by which to judge the theories of deductive reasoning discussed by Evans (1991). Judged by this criterion, theories whose goal is to explain logically competent performance are inadequate (Oaksford & Chater, 1991). Thus Evans's assessment of the state of current theories of reasoning requires revision

Bounded function · Bounded rationality · Epistemology · Heuristics · LOPES · Mathematical economics · Rationality · Cognitive Science and Mapping · Complex Systems and Decision Making · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence

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Citations per year0.29
Citation span1992 - 2023 (32)
Highly citedNo

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