On What Gibson (and the Rest of Us) Cannot Do without
Comment on Sharrock and Coulter (1998)
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20401520 |
|---|---|
| Authors | N E Wetherick (Edinburgh, Scotland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 551-556 |
| Publication date | 1999-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theory & Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0959-3543 • E-ISSN: 1461-7447 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0959354399094007 |
| OpenAlex | W2016168844 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 5 |
Sharrock and Coulter (1998) suggest that no process intervenes between the perceiver and the perceived object. Perception is simply the assimilation of objects to linguistic categories. Both Gibson and the cognitivists err in supposing otherwise, though Gibson is nearer the truth since he insists that what we perceive are objects in the real world, not mental models of them. It is here suggested (following Taylor, 1962) that all parties have overlooked the need for a learning process to enable us to perceive objects as objects in the real world, prior to categorization. It is not self-evident how we get from the visual input to the perceived object, nor can the process rationally be regarded as innate
Categorization · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Perception · Categorization, perception, and language · Computer Science · Philosophy · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence
| Citations per year | 0.15 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1999 - 2003 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |