Should psychology adopt Bhaskar’s critical realist philosophy of science
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20401746 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brian D Haig (0000-0001-9003-6100, University of Canterbury, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 585-590 |
| Publication date | 2024-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theory & Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0959-3543 • E-ISSN: 1461-7447 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/09593543241265727 |
| OpenAlex | W4403046587 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 12 |
Robert Archer argues that psychology should abandon its use of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. He recommends that psychology ought to adopt the philosophy of critical realism in its place. I put Archer’s concern with Popper to one side and provide a selective critique of mainstream critical realism, in the light of some developments in contemporary philosophy of science. I express some misgivings about the ontological commitments of Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism, and comment on the limitations of his DREI(C) model of scientific inquiry. In doing so, I also respond to a number of critical remarks Archer makes about replication in psychology
Cognitive science · Epistemology · Philosophy of psychology · Philosophy of science · Realism · Sociology · Critical Realism in Sociology · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |