Genetic Epistemology and Piaget's Philosophy of Science

Piaget vs. Kuhn on Scientific Progress

Bibliographic Data

ID20401872
AuthorsJonathan Y Tsou (0000-0002-3939-1518, University of Chicago, corresponding author)
Year2006
Volume16
Issue2
Pages203-224
Publication date2006-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheory & Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0959-3543 • E-ISSN: 1461-7447
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0959354306062536
OpenAlexW2107010055
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited26

This paper concerns Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) philosophy of science and, in particular, the picture of scientific development suggested by his theory of genetic epistemology. The aims of the paper are threefold: (1) to examine genetic epistemology as a theory concerning the growth of knowledge both in the individual and in science; (2) to explicate Piaget's view of ‘scientific progress’, which is grounded in his theory of equilibration; and (3) to juxtapose Piaget's notion of progress with Thomas Kuhn's (1922–1996). Issues of scientific continuity, scientific realism and scientific rationality are discussed. It is argued that Piaget's view highlights weaknesses in Kuhn's ‘discontinuous’ picture of scientific change

Cognition · Cognitive development · Epistemology · Evolutionary epistemology · Genetic epistemology · Philosophy of science · Piaget's theory of cognitive development · Rationality · Realism · Scientific realism · Social epistemology · Sociology · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology · Evolution and Science Education · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology

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