Controlling and Motivating the Workforce
Evidence from the Banking Industry in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20437003 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew J Seltzer (0000-0002-9826-7082, Royal Holloway University of London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 219-238 |
| Publication date | 2000-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australian Economic History Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8992 • E-ISSN: 1467-8446 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-8446.00066 |
| OpenAlex | W2089128579 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
Large banks have a considerable advantage over their smaller rivals because they are better able to diversify their portfolios. However, to achieve this advantage they must overcome agency problems associated with delegating decision making to non‐owner employees. This paper uses evidence from the Union Bank of Australia to examine mechanisms used to monitor and motivate workers. Monitoring took the form of rigorous screening, beginning with the hiring process and continuing with frequent performance evaluations. Workers were also given strict rules of behaviour and incentives to supply effort in the form of seniority‐based wages, performance‐based promotions, and a generous pension plan
Agency (philosophy) · Business · Competition (biology) · Economic growth · Economics · Incentive · Labour economics · Market economy · Pension · Plan (archaeology) · Political science · Process (computing) · Seniority · Workforce · Finance · Historical Economic and Social Studies · Labor Movements and Unions · Law
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,24 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2026 (26) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |