Locke and Hume on competing miracles
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20475438 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nathan Rockwood (0000-0001-5781-9488, Brigham Young University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 603-617 |
| Publication date | 2022-08-18 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412522000464 |
| OpenAlex | W4292180134 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
Christian apologists argue that the testimony of the miracles of Jesus provide evidence for Christianity. Hume tries to undermine this argument by pointing out that miracles are said to occur in other religious traditions and so miracles do not give us reason to believe in Christianity over the alternatives. Thus, competing miracles act as an undercutting defeater for the argument from miracles for Christianity. Yet, before Hume, Locke responds to this kind of objection, and in this article I explain and defend his response. In short, Locke argues that God will ensure that there is more evidence for Christianity (if true) and this greater evidence is an undercutting defeater for Hume's competing miracles defeater (i.e. it is a defeater-defeater). If so, then, as Locke argues, competing miracles do not weaken the evidence from miracles for Christianity
Argument (complex analysis) · Christianity · Epistemology · Teleological argument · Theology · Philosophy · Reformation and Early Modern Christianity · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Highly cited | No |
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