The Neurological Fallacy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20484602 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Reuven Tsur (Tel Aviv University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 429-446 |
| Publication date | 2012-12-31 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Pragmatics & Cognition (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0929-0907 • E-ISSN: 1569-9943 |
| Publisher | John Benjamins Publishing Company (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1075/pc.20.3.01tsu |
| OpenAlex | W1968623855 |
| Language | EN |
This non-article explores the limitations of applying brain science in “higher” disciplines. Many brain scientists believe that it is only a matter of time that everything human will be accounted for by the findings of brain science. Michael Polányi in the nineteen-sixties and recently Michael Gazzaniga argued against such determinism. They say that while “lower-level” processes constrain “higher-level” ones, they cannot determine them. The human mind is an emergent process, and it cannot be predicted from brain structure anymore than traffic can be predicted from the structure of a car. I claim that in many instances, the application of brain science in psychology and literary studies merely re-states in brain-language what has already been said in psychology-language or literature-language. It can, however, be fruitfully applied when it refutes prevalent erroneous assumptions or resolves certain incongruities in the domain of “higher” disciplines
Cognitive science · Determinism · Epistemology · Fallacy · Philosophy of science · Neuroscience, Education and Cognitive Function · Philosophy · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|