Consciousness and the feeling body
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20484662 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Julian Kiverstein (0000-0003-3428-8367, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 607-616 |
| Publication date | 2010-12-31 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Pragmatics & Cognition (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0929-0907 • E-ISSN: 1569-9943 |
| Publisher | John Benjamins Publishing Company (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1075/pc.18.3.09kiv |
| OpenAlex | W2028672044 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
In How the Mind Uses the Brain Ralph Ellis and Natika Newton develop a novel embodied, enactive theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness has its basis in neural systems that prepare the system to perform actions of emotional significance to the organism. Consciousness emerges out of self-organising processes which function in such a way as to contribute to, and maintain, the organism’s overall wellbeing. I’ll begin this review by reconstructing Ellis and Newton’s view of consciousness as a self-organising process, and then go on to compare and contrast the enactive theory with the model of consciousness Chris Frith has outlined in his lectures
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Embodied cognition · Epistemology · Feeling · Frith · Action Observation and Synchronization · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
Affective Neuroscience
Thinking about Consciousness
Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain
Embodied simulation
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Inattentional Blindness
What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness
| Highly cited | No |
|---|