Kant's Only Possible Argument and Chignell's Real Harmony

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20510312
AutoresUygar Abaci, Uygar Abacı (University of Richmond, autor de correspondencia)
Año2014
Volumen19
Número1
Páginas1-25
Fecha de publicación2014-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaKantian Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s1369415413000277
OpenAlexW2313924583
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas16

Andrew Chignell recently proposed an original reconstruction of Kant's ‘Only Possible Argument’ for the existence of God. Chignell claims that what motivates the ‘Grounding Premise’ of Kant's proof, ‘real possibility must be grounded in actuality’, is the requirement that the predicates of a really possible thing must be ‘really harmonious’, i.e. compatible in an extra-logical or metaphysical sense. I take issue with Chignell's reconstruction. First, the pre-Critical Kant does not present ‘real harmony’ as a general condition of real possibility. Second, the real harmony requirement is not what motivates the ‘Grounding Premise’ of the proof. Instead, this premise is sufficiently motivated by what Chignell labels the ‘content’ requirement. Finally, Kant's downgrading of the proof in his Critical period is not based on a concern regarding the real harmony of the predicates of God, but on his Critical restrictions on cognition in general and modal cognition in particular

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Harmony (color) · Metaphysics · Modal · Ontological argument · Premise · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil