Between Faith and Judgement
Kant’s Dual Conception of Moral Certainty
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20510317 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sara Di Giulio (0009-0001-6223-2144, University of Tübingen, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 187-207 |
| Publication date | 2024-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Kantian Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s1369415424000025 |
| OpenAlex | W4392658705 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 25 |
There are two main meanings in Kant’s concept of moral certainty ( moralische Gewissheit , certitudo moralis ): first, it applies to the kind of certainty embodied in rational faith in the existence of God and a future life; second, it applies to the conscientiousness ( Gewissenhaftigkeit ) required of an agent in the practice of moral judgement. Despite the growing attention to Kant’s theory of conscience and his concept of conscientiousness, this article is the first to discuss ‘moral certainty’ as the aim of ‘conscientiousness’ and to highlight the relevance of both notions in regard to moral education and the purposes of Kant’s ethical doctrines of method
Certainty · Epistemology · Faith · Good faith · Judgement · Political science · Theology · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification
The Debate on Probable Opinions in the Scholastic Tradition
The Emergence of Probability
Kant und die Kasuistik
Logic or the Art of Thinking
Kant and Crusius on Belief and Practical Justification
Kantian Non-Evidentialism and its German Antecedents
When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks
Belief in Kant
Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason
The Development and Scope of Kantian Belief
Kant on Opinion
Kant-Lexikon
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |