Representation and Reality in Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason

Bibliographic Data

ID20510331
AuthorsDamian Melamedoff-Vosters (0009-0007-2548-2949, New York University Shanghai, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume28
Issue4
Pages615-634
Publication date2023-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueKantian Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s1369415423000341
OpenAlexW4387458949
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited24

In this article, I take on a classic objection to Kant’s arguments in the Antinomy of Pure Reason: that the arguments are question-begging, as they draw illicit inferences from claims about representation to claims about reality. While extant attempts to vindicate Kant try to show that he does not make such inferences, I attempt to vindicate Kant’s arguments in a different way: I show that, given Kant’s philosophical backdrop, the inferences in question are not illicit. This is because the transcendental realists that Kant was arguing against have certain philosophical commitments about the nature of ground which, if true, warrant the inferences that Kant draws. This historical corrective not only allows us to better understand Kant’s own thinking in the Antinomies but it also has important upshots for our understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism

Antinomy · Epistemology · Extant taxon · Politics · Practical reason · Transcendental idealism · Transcendental number · Warrant · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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