Do we Always Act on Maxims
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20510337 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sven Nyholm (0000-0002-3836-5932, Eindhoven University of Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 233-255 |
| Publication date | 2017-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Kantian Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s1369415417000036 |
| OpenAlex | W2611821976 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 17 |
It is commonly thought that on Kant’s view of action, ‘everyone always acts on maxims’. Call this the ‘descriptive reading’. This reading faces two important problems. First, the idea that people always act on maxims offends against common sense: it clashes with our ordinary ideas about human agency. Second, there are various passages in which Kant says that it is ‘rare’ and ‘admirable’ to firmly adhere to a set of basic principles that we adopt for ourselves. This article offers an alternative: the ‘normative reading’. On this reading, it is a normative ideal to adopt and act on maxims: it is one of the things we would do if our reason were fully in control of our decision-making
Epistemology · Linguistics · Normative · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
Kant's Theory of Freedom
Kants Maximenethik und ihre Begründung
The Robust Demands of the Good
Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness
The Sources of Normativity
Kant and the Interests of Reason
Implementation intentions
Kant's Theory of Action
On K ant's Idea of Humanity as an End in Itself
Self-Constitution
"Kants "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten
Interpreting Kant's Critiques
Recent Work on Kantian Maxims I
Recent Work on Kantian Maxims II
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |