The ‘Perfected System of Criticism’
Schopenhauer's Initial Disagreements with Kant
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20510426 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthias Kossler (0009-0008-0298-1873, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 459-478 |
| Publication date | 2012-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Kantian Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s1369415412000179 |
| OpenAlex | W2029032448 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 8 |
I would like to know who of my contemporaries should be more competent in Kantian philosophy than me . (Schopenhauer in a letter to Rosenkranz and Schubert, 1837 1 ) In this paper the attempt is made to show how Schopenhauer's critique of Kant leads from initial disagreements to a fundamental modification, even a new formation, of the Kantian concepts of understanding, reason, imagination, perception, idea and thing-in-itself. The starting point and the core of his critique is the demand for the appreciation of intuitive knowledge which is apart from and independent of reason. The intuitive knowledge goes back to images and its highest form is aesthetic contemplation. Without a participation of concepts it is sufficient to explain objective reality. Particularly on the basis of Schopenhauer's critical examination of Kant's schematism it can be shown that his alternative conception of an image-based objectivity of experience is to be taken seriously, even if the way he presents it sometimes gives the impression of a mere misunderstanding of Kant's theory of cognition
Aesthetics · Contemplation · Criticism · Epistemology · Literature · Objectivity (philosophy) · Perception · German Literature and Culture Studies · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.4 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |