Transcendental Apperception
Consciousness or Self-Consciousness? Comments on Chapter 9 of Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Thinker
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20511010 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ralf Busse (0000-0003-4961-9130, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 109-117 |
| Publication date | 2014-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Kantian Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s1369415413000320 |
| OpenAlex | W2091802188 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations ‘as such’ and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or ‘self-made-ness’ of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations ‘as such’ should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack the theoretical resources to clearly distinguish between (first-level) consciousness and self-consciousness or apperception properly so-called
Apperception · Consciousness · Epistemology · Psychoanalysis · Reflexive pronoun · Reflexivity · Self-consciousness · Sociology · Transcendental idealism · Transcendental number · Anthropology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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