Hard power in the Black Sea region

The Russia–Georgia war of August 2008 re-established the saliency of hard power in the Black Sea region. Yet security realities have turned out far differently than most at the time expected. NATO enlargement is off the table, but NATO’s partnerships – not least of all with Georgia – are far from moribund. Russia’s discontent with the international order is overshadowed by its despondency about itself. Its radical defence reform has produced turmoil rather than coherence. Its geopolitical advances have produced few geopolitical advantages. Georgia and Ukraine each retain the capacity to dishearten supporters and exasperate antagonists. The loss of Abkhazia and South Osetia has neither weakened Georgia nor its president. Ukraine’s pre-emptive concessions to Russia have neither diminished Russian pressure nor Ukraine’s determination to resist it. Although Turkey remains a determinant regional actor, it is more preoccupied with Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and its own domestic problems than with its northern neighbourhood. For all this, the region remains defined by asymmetry of interest, capacity and perception – and distrust. It would be unwise to expect predictability and prudent to expect the unexpected

China · Development economics · Distrust · Economics · Economy · Geopolitics · Middle East · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · Healthcare, Law, Governance, and Management Studies · Law · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics

• The Politics of Russia's Elusive Defense Reform

  Open Access•Zoltan Barany•Political Science Quarterly•2006

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