Reclaiming Naturalized Critical Realism

Response to McWherter

Bibliographic Data

ID21159673
AuthorsTuukka Kaidesoja (0000-0002-9633-2944, University of Helsinki, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume16
Issue2
Pages200-222
Publication date2017-03-15
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Critical Realism (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1476-7430 • E-ISSN: 1572-5138
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/14767430.2016.1255100
OpenAlexW2562583167
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited18

This article responds to McWherter’s detailed critique of my assessment of Roy Bhaskar’s method of transcendental argumentation in chapter four of my Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology (2013). I begin by describing some naturalist ontological and epistemological views defended in my book, thereby showing that my naturalist challenge to the original version of critical realism is not only methodological (or metaphilosophical) but also substantial. I also indicate that this point is effectively downplayed in McWherter’s framing of the debate in terms of competing metaphilosophies. I then consider how the doctrine of transcendental idealism is presupposed in Kant’s transcendental deduction and question the consistency of McWherter’s various descriptions of Bhaskar’s transcendental arguments. Finally, I provide detailed responses to McWherter’s objectives to my views. My conclusion is that naturalized critical realism is a more coherent and scientifically viable position than the neo-Kantian version of critical realism defended by McWherter. Nevertheless, I think that there is enough overlap between original and naturalized critical realism to regard the latter as a revised and elaborated version of the former

Epistemology · Realism · Sociology · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Critical Realism in Sociology · Philosophy · Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research

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