Mental logic and its difficulties with disjunction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21180427 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Miguel López-Astorga (0000-0002-6004-0587, University of Talca, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 0 |
| Publication date | 2016-05-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Círculo de lingüística aplicada a la comunicación (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1576-4737 • E-ISSN: 1576-4737 |
| Publisher | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.5209/clac.52772 |
| OpenAlex | W2414117110 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 3 |
The mental logic theory does not accept the disjunction introduction rule of standard propositional calculus as a natural schema of the human mind. In this way, the problem that I want to show in this paper is that, however, that theory does admit another much more complex schema in which the mentioned rule must be used as a previous step. So, I try to argue that this is a very important problem that the mental logic theory needs to solve, and claim that another rival theory, the mental models theory, does not have these difficulties
Classical logic · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Mental model · Programming language · Propositional calculus · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |