The 1974 Paracel Islands Incident

The purpose of the research paper. This article examines the 1974 Paracel Islands incident within the framework of the United States (U.S.)-China-Soviet strategic triangle. It aims to explain China’s resort to force, analyze the U.S. decision to maintain neutrality despite its alliance with the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), and evaluate the RVN’s diplomatic strategy through the lens of political realism. The scientific novelty. The originality of this research lies in its systematic use of multidimensional archival sources, particularly from the RVN, the U.S., and France, that have been underutilized in prior scholarship. These sources shed new light on Washington’s calculated neutrality and Paris’s cautious assessments. By situating the Paracel Islands incident within the broader context of Sino-American détente and U.S. strategic retrenchment, the study moves beyond a purely legalistic perspective. It also offers a fresh interpretation of the RVN’s failed attempt to internationalize the dispute through multilateral diplomacy, identifying the 1974 event as the starting point of China’s incremental ‘salami-slicing’ strategy, which later manifested in the Spratly clash of 1988 and the ongoing militarization of the South China Sea in the 21st century. Conclusions. The Paracel Islands incident demonstrates how China exploited the post-Paris Accords power vacuum and the realignment of U.S. strategic priorities to establish full control over the islands. Washington’s neutrality reflected not a lack of capability but a deliberate choice to safeguard détente and manage domestic constraints. Meanwhile, the RVN’s diplomatic efforts, though successful in raising international awareness, proved largely symbolic in the face of structural power asymmetries and the pragmatic calculations of major powers. Overall, the study underscores the decisive role of power politics in sovereignty disputes and highlights the need for further research, particularly through newly declassified Chinese sources, to deepen our understanding of Beijing’s strategic calculus and the long-term implications of the 1974 Paracel Islands incident for the evolving order in the South China Sea. Funding. This research is funded by Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh City (VNU-HCM) under grant number B2025-18b-06

Alliance · China · Militarization · Neutrality · Politics · Reinterpretation · Global Political and Economic Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies