Emergence and Downward Causation Reconsidered in Terms of the Aristotelian-Thomistic View of Causation and Divine Action

Bibliographic Data

ID21244947
AuthorsMariusz Tabaczek (0000-0001-6985-8337, University of Notre Dame, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume4
Issue1
Pages115
Publication date2016-04-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueScientia et Fides (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2353-5636 • E-ISSN: 2300-7648
PublisherUniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika/Nicolaus Copernicus University (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.12775/setf.2016.010
OpenAlexW2464228704
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited10

One of the main challenges of the nonreductionist approach to complex structures and phenomena in philosophy of biology is its defense of the plausibility of the theory of emergence and downward causation. The tension between remaining faithful to the rules of physicalism and physical causal closure, while defending the novelty and distinctiveness of emergents from their basal constituents, makes the argumentation of many proponents of emergentism lacking in coherency and precision. In this article I aim at answering the suggestion of several thinkers to redefine emergence and downward causation in terms of the broader Aristotelian view of causation. In addition, I further develop this interdisciplinary conversation to include theological implications of emergentism, analyzed in reference to Aquinas’ understanding of divine action in terms of the same fourfold division of causes—bringing thus natural science, philosophy, and theology into creative and fruitful dialogue

Argumentation theory · Causation · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Physicalism · Supervenience · Evolution and Science Education · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life

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