The peccatum naturae and the moral condition of the will. A convergence between Aquinas and Rosmini
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21245075 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Juan Francisco Franck (0000-0002-7480-0188, Saint Thomas Aquinas North University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 215 |
| Publication date | 2019-09-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Scientia et Fides (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2353-5636 • E-ISSN: 2300-7648 |
| Publisher | Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika/Nicolaus Copernicus University (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.12775/setf.2019.024 |
| OpenAlex | W2975920752 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 1 |
My purpose in this paper is to illustrate that what the Christian tradition calls the peccatum naturae consists neither in the mere privation of the gift of original justice and of grace, nor in the total corruption of nature. I try to dig into the conceptual conditions under which we can coherently understand that our present condition is characterized by a twisted inclination of the will, which without totally corrupting human nature, still runs contrary to its proper good and cannot be considered as belonging or being inherent to it. I first present Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the peccatum naturae as a moral defect and not simply as privation. Then, I take recourse mostly to Rosmini’s work in order to better understand how we can have a moral weakness, which could be rightly called corruption, without our moral condition being completely irrecoverable. In other words, how can the will be in a sinful condition if no actual fault can be imputed to the person, for that is the notion of a sin of nature
Epistemology · Morality · Sociology · Evolving Legal Systems and Governance · Historical Economic and Legal Thought · Multicultural Socio-Legal Studies · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |