Inside the Mind of the Self-Deceiver

Foundational Issues in Relation to Human Defences and “the Unconscious”

Bibliographic Data

ID21252111
AuthorsHenrik Høgh‐Olesen (0000-0003-4715-7243, Aarhus University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Publication date2024-11-11
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueHuman Arenas (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2522-5790 • E-ISSN: 2522-5804
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s42087-024-00458-7
OpenAlexW4404222419
LanguageEN
References cited16

There are many foundational questions involved in understanding our defences. Are these manoeuvres unconscious processes to which we fall prey, as psychoanalytic metapsychology suggests? Or are they the product of a conscious and motivated strategy initiated by the individual? I argue for the latter. The concept of “unconscious defence” lacks explanatory power as it initiates an endless cycle of defence mechanisms. Alternatively, focus is directed towards consciousness and the pre-reflective moment when the ego evades addressing troubling content of consciousness. Existential philosophers such as Sartre (Being and nothingness, Methuen & Co, 1943) and Fingarette (Self-deception, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969) are used as stepping stones in making this “Copernican” shift in perspective, and core affective processes are introduced as the organismic centre of rotation behind our defences. Core affective processes play an important role in the toning of our emotions and moods, and I argue that they also play a leading role in the activation of our defences. Finally, ethical issues raised by self-deception in psychological practice are touched upon. Should the truth always be revealed, or should psychologists occasionally engage in cost-benefit analysis

Cognitive science · Epistemology · Psychoanalysis · Unconscious mind · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · War, Ethics, and Justification

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