Shareholder activism in listed family firms
Exploring the effectiveness of say‐on‐pay on CEO compensation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21259293 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gregorio Sánchez Marín (0000-0003-0175-814X, Universidad de Alcalá), Gabriel Lozano‐Reina (0000-0002-1225-3422, Universidad de Murcia, corresponding author), J Samuel Baixauli‐Soler (0000-0003-2444-6894, Universidad de Murcia) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 308-330 |
| Publication date | 2024-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2694-6416 • E-ISSN: 2694-6424 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/beer.12604 |
| OpenAlex | W4386891018 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 136 |
The widespread critical evidence surrounding executive compensation of listed corporations has boosted shareholder activism in recent decades. The say‐on‐pay (SOP) mechanism—a vote in which shareholders express their (dis)agreement with executive pay designs—is one of the corporate governance mechanisms that has led to this activism among listed firms. Merging agency and socioemotional wealth (SEW) arguments, this paper analyzes how effective SOP voting results are among listed family firms in terms of CEO compensation efficiency and equity. Using a sample of UK listed firms from 2011 to 2018, our results show that SOP effectiveness is positively influenced by family ownership and is strongly moderated by family involvement in management and in governance as well as by family generation. Our findings stress the strong family effect and the ethical perceptions of family shareholders on SOP voting, showing how family participation in the firm encourages fairer and more aligned CEO compensation packages. SOP institutional and practical implications oriented to preserve shareholder value and family wealth are finally outlined
Business · Corporate governance · Executive compensation · Institutional investor · Political science · Politics · Principal–agent problem · Shareholder · Socioemotional selectivity theory · Voting · Corporate Finance and Governance · Family Business Performance and Succession · Law · Working Capital and Financial Performance · Accounting · Finance
Tunneling
Instrumental Variables and GMM
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Variations in R&D Investments of Family and Nonfamily Firms
Family Firms and Social Responsibility
Agency Relationships in Family Firms
Family Control and Family Firm Valuation by Family CEOs
Are Family Firms Really More Socially Responsible?
Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms
Theory of the firm
Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators
Beyond the Proxy Vote
Manual de Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) (Segunda Edición)
Say-on-Pay Votes
Empirical Evidence on the Role of Proxy Advisors in European Capital Markets
Tipping Point
Investor protection and corporate governance
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |