Hartman's quandary
Reconciling pluralism and realism for virtue ethics in business
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21259832 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nisigandha Bhuyan (0000-0002-4214-7372, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, corresponding author), Arunima Chakraborty (0000-0001-5436-8423, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences Calcutta) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 226-235 |
| Publication date | 2023-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2694-6416 • E-ISSN: 2694-6424 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/beer.12454 |
| OpenAlex | W4293250587 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 23 |
There is considerable consensus on the idea that Aristotelian virtue ethics advocates moral realism. In numerous works, the well‐known business ethicist Edwin Hartman grapples with reconciling the unitary vision of life that a particular kind of moral realism advocates and the pluralist respect for diverse cultures and belief systems that comprise our world. This paper closely follows Hartman's efforts to reconcile his liberal values with his guarded support for Aristotelian moral realism. We argue that the realist interpretation of Aristotle's function argument can be employed to strengthen Hartman's critique of the concept of Homo economicus, which is often posited by its proponents and critics alike as the only viable position for a business manager. Drawing from Aristotle, the paper posits a novel notion of species‐excellence as the ultimate telos of human life and an objective basis for a critique of Homo economicus
Economics · Epistemology · Homo economicus · Philosophical realism · Positive economics · Realism · Sociology · Telos · Virtue · Virtue ethics · Ethics in Business and Education · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |