Russo–Ukrainian war
Limits of Western economic sanctions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21281995 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Steven Rosefielde (0000-0002-1722-7936, Department of Economics, University of North Carolina, Gardner Hall, Campus Box 3305, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3305, USA), Michael Bernstam (Hoover Institution, Stanford University, USA), Michael S Bernstam (Hoover Institution) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-17 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Acta Oeconomica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0001-6373 • E-ISSN: 1588-2659 |
| Publisher | Akademiai Kiado Zrt. (PUBLISHER • HU) |
| DOI | 10.1556/032.2024.00001 |
| OpenAlex | W4393200432 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
The potency of economic sanctions imposed on nations depends on demand and supply adjustment possibilities. Adverse GDP impacts will be maximal when import, export, production, distribution and finance are inflexible (universal non-substitution). This paper elaborates these conditions, and quantifies the maximum GDP loss that Western sanctions could have inflicted on Russia in 2022–2023. It reports the World Bank's predictions, contrasts them with results and draws inferences about the efficiency of Russia's workably competitive markets. The paper shows that Russia's economic system exhibits moderate universal substitutability and is less vulnerable to punitive discipline than Western policymakers suppose. The likelihood that the Kremlin will restore Ukraine's territorial integrity, ceteris paribus , is correspondingly low. The authors also observe that unintended adverse side effects from sanctions and counter-sanctions were excessive because policymakers chose to maximize GDP-damage to Russia instead of optimizing Western and third-party net benefits. Given moderate substitutability, Western policymakers can switch to smart net benefit maximizing sanctions that enhance Western and third-party welfare without significantly bolstering Russia's military industrial productivity and war-waging capabilities by retaining embargoes on weapons, technology and critical components, while selectively softening other restrictions. Smart sanctions might facilitate a negotiated settlement of the Russo–Ukrainian war
Business · Economic sanctions · Political science · Sanctions · Ukrainian · Economic and Technological Developments in Russia · Economic Issues in Ukraine · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Law
The real national income of Soviet Russia since 1928.
The general theory of employment, interest, and money
Linear programming and economic analysis
Social choice and welfare economics under representative government
Economic Trends in the Soviet Union
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
Escaping the Resource Curse
Economic Sanctions
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |