Are rights really so wrong? A response to Nigel Biggar’s What’s Wrong with Rights

In my response to Nigel Biggar’s book What’s Wrong with Rights, I argue that an epidemic of rights-fundamentalism does not require the complete rejection of all rights language. Rather, it is possible to use rights language in a way that reconceptualizes and broadens our understanding of duty, and advances our moral discourse and growth in virtue, rather than hindering it. To demonstrate this point, I contrast Biggar’s example of a problematic ruling by the Canadian Supreme Court with a more thoughtful and nuanced approach to rights language demonstrated by a series of cases on free speech in schools issued by the U.S. Supreme Court. I also offer a re-reading of Francisco de Vitoria’s development of rights language to argue that his presentation of rights overcomes many of Biggar’s critiques

Bill of rights · Duty · Fundamental rights · Fundamentalism · Human rights · Political science · Politics · Reading (process) · Sociology · Supreme court · Virtue · Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law in Society and Culture · Philosophy