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Future Contingents, Bivalence, and the Excluded Middle in Aristotle

Bibliographic Data

ID21291480
AuthorsChristopher Izgin (0000-0001-5654-0952, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume107
Issue2
Pages171-211
Publication date2025-06-04
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-9101 • E-ISSN: 0943-3988
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/agph-2023-0189
OpenAlexW4402317494
LanguageEN
References cited29

The principle of bivalence (PB) states that every declarative sentence is either true or false, and the principle of excluded middle (PEM) states that one member of any contradictory pair must be true. According to the standard interpretation of Int . 9, PB fails for future contingents. Moreover, some standardists believe that PEM fails for pairs of contradictory future contingents, whereas other standardists attempt to rescue PEM by applying the method of supervaluations. I argue that PB and PEM are not suspended and that the method of supervaluations fails to explain how PEM holds. I propose an interpretation of Int . 9 according to which neither PB nor PEM fails

Law of excluded middle · Linguistics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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Highly citedNo

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