Causal Priority in Metaphysics Θ.8

Bibliographic Data

ID21291504
AuthorsKatherine Meadows (Indiana University Department of Philosophy 1033 E Third St, Sycamore Hall 026, IN 47405 Bloomington USA, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume105
Issue2
Pages197-240
Publication date2023-06-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-9101 • E-ISSN: 0943-3988
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/agph-2018-0117
OpenAlexW3206830132
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited17

Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.8 argument for the priority of actuality to potentiality poses an immediate interpretive problem: the argument uses two distinct tests for priority, one of which threatens to reverse the results of the other. This paper argues that the standard approach to this passage, according to which one thing is prior to another when it satisfies the ontological independence test from Metaphysics Δ.11, fails to secure the argumentative unity of the passage. It introduces a new, causal account of priority which explains both Aristotle’s claims about priority and the way he argues for them

Argument (complex analysis) · Argumentative · Epistemology · Independence (probability theory) · Metaphysics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Mathematics · Philosophy

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