The Analysis of False Judgement According to Being and Not-Being in Plato’s Theaetetus (188c10–189b9)

Bibliographic Data

ID21291560
AuthorsPaolo Crivelli (0009-0004-0985-0893, University of Geneva Department of Philosophy rue de Candolle 2 Geneva 1211 Schweiz, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume105
Issue4
Pages509-566
Publication date2023-11-20
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-9101 • E-ISSN: 0943-3988
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/agph-2020-0186
OpenAlexW3206295450
LanguageEN
References cited70

The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is “he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever” (188d3–4), how should the clause “about anything whatsoever” be construed? In common with “he who judges” and “the things which are not” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not about it”), or exclusively with “he who judges” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not”)? The most plausible answer is that both construals are envisaged. Accordingly, the argument has two branches corresponding to these two alternative construals. In particular, it attempts to show that in both cases the cognizer will address what does not exist – an impossibility. The idea that a false judgement is concerned with what is not about its reference has a clear echo in the Sophist . The way in which the problem is handled in the Theaetetus provides a hint that can help to find a solution for the hotly debated issue of the interpretation of the Sophist ’s account of false statement

Argument (complex analysis) · Construal level theory · Construals · Epistemology · Impossibility · Interpretation (philosophy) · Judgement · Linguistics · Political science · Reductio ad absurdum · Sophist · Statement (logic) · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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