Aristotle on Perception and Perception-like Appearance

De Anima 3.3, 428b10–29a9

Bibliographic Data

ID21291663
AuthorsEvan Keeling (0000-0002-7840-0368, University of Sao Paulo Philosophy Department Sao Paulo Brazil, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume106
Issue4
Pages665-690
Publication date2024-11-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-9101 • E-ISSN: 0943-3988
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/agph-2021-0139
OpenAlexW4361279463
LanguageEN
References cited29

It is now common to explain some of incidental perception’s features by means of a different capacity, called phantasia . Phantasia , usually translated as ‘imagination,’ is thought to explain how incidental perception can be false and representational by being a constitutive part of perception. Through a close reading of De Anima 3.3, 428b10–29a9, I argue against this and for perception first : phantasia is always a product of perception, from which it initially inherits all its characteristics. No feature of perception is explained directly by phantasia , and phantasia is never a part of perception. Phantasia is not imagination or representation, as many have thought, but perception-like appearance. Aristotle thus recognizes alongside three different types of perception three different types of perception-like appearance

Cognitive psychology · Linguistics · Perception · Politics · Reading (process) · Representation (politics) · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Philosophy · Psychology