Transformativism and Expressivity in Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21291733 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Julia Peters (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg Department of Philosophy Schulgasse 6 Heidelberg Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 106 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 295-312 |
| Publication date | 2024-06-06 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-9101 • E-ISSN: 0943-3988 |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/agph-2021-0082 |
| OpenAlex | W4392655104 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 6 |
According to a major trend in Hegel scholarship, Hegel advocates a McDowell-style transformativist conception of the human mind. Central to this conception is a methodological dualism, according to which phenomena belonging to the rational mind, in contrast to those belonging to non-rational nature, must be accounted for from within the ‘space of reasons.’ In this paper I argue, by contrast, that Hegel rejects methodological dualism. For Hegel, a constitutive aspect of the rational mind is the activity of expression. I show how Hegel’s philosophy of mind adequately accounts for low-level forms of expressivity without appealing to capacities connected to conceptual thought and judgment, and that he does so by drawing on methods similar to those employed within the empirical sciences of his time. Thus, for Hegel, the sphere of the rational mind is broader than the McDowellian space of reasons
Dialectic · Dualism · Epistemology · Expression (computer science) · Hegelianism · Relation (database) · Scholarship · Computer Science · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Weber, Simmel, Sociological Theory
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |