Does the Anti-essentialist Consensus About Species Rest on a Mistake

Bibliographic Data

ID21293399
AuthorsSamir Okasha (0000-0001-6595-7557, University of Bristol, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume104
Issue1
Pages17-35
Publication date2026-01-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2025.2499919
OpenAlexW4411137644
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited32

A long-established consensus in the philosophy of biology holds that biological species are not natural kinds with intrinsic essences, despite what Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980) thought. This anti-essentialist consensus has recently been challenged by Michael Devitt, who insists that it rests on a mistake. According to Devitt, philosophers of biology have failed to recognise the distinction between two quite different questions one can ask about species: the Category question and the Taxon question. The various ‘species concepts’ found in the biological literature are attempts to answer the former but are silent about the latter, Devitt claims, so do not conflict with essentialism, pace what philosophers of biology believe. By carefully attending to the logical relation between the Category and Taxon questions, Devitt’s claim that the anti-essentialist consensus rests on a mistake is shown to be untenable

Epistemology · Essentialism · Mistake · Political science · Rest (music) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Internal Medicine · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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