Two Arguments for Objectivism about Moral Permissibility
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293414 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter A Graham (0000-0002-5670-2461, University of Massachusetts Amherst, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 99 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 100-113 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2020.1716818 |
| OpenAlex | W3008784274 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 10 |
Is what we’re morally permitted to do grounded in our subjective situation? Subjectivists maintain that it is. Objectivists deny this. I shall offer two arguments for Objectivism about moral permissibility
Epistemology · Objectivism · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |